Do we remember what pain feels like? Investigations into
this question have sometimes led to ambiguous or apparently contradictory
results. Building on research on pain memory by Rohini Terry
and colleagues, I argue that this lack of agreement may be due in part
to the difficulty researchers face when trying to convey to their study’s
participants the type of memory they are being tasked with recalling.
To address this difficulty, I introduce the concept of ‘qualitative
memory’, which, arguably, is the sort of memory we have of what red
looks like yet lack with respect to pain. I also briefly address a number
of consequences the acknowledgment of qualitative memory would
potentially have for philosophy, arguing that if we fail to have qualitative
memories of certain sensations, such as pain, the standard philosophical
accounts of experience, rational choice, and the sources of
moral action may all need revision.
The full paper, along with response essays by Sabrina Conix, Filipe de Brigard, and L. A. Paul, and an introduction by Claudia Passos-Ferreira, was published in Journal of Consciousness Studies Volume 27, Numbers 11-12, 2020, pp. 102-125(24)
Barbara Gail Montero 