Tag Archives: the physical

Northwestern Philosophy Workshop: “Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy Of Mind”

Philosophers at Northwestern University helped me with my paper on nineteenth-century German philosophy of mind. While I was there, I also had a lively discussion about expertise and Plato’s Ion, as a guest in Rachel Zuckert’s aesthetics course.   Here are some photos; the first few are from the class; the last couple, from the workshop.

IMG_0622 German Philosophy Northwestern

Philosophy of Mind in Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy

A draft of Philosophy of Mind in Nineteenth-Century, forthcoming in “Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy,” edited by Michael Forster and Kristin Gjesdal.

Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World

Montero (2006). Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World, Erkentnis64 (2):177-191.

Draft of Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World

Might the world be structured, as Leibniz thought, so that every part of matter is divided ad infinitum? The Physicist David Bohm accepted infinitely decomposable matter, and even Steven Weinberg, a staunch supporter of the idea that science is converging on a final theory, admits the possibility of an endless chain of ever more fundamental theories. However, if there is no fundamental level, physicalism, thought of as the view that everything is determined by fundamental phenomena and that all fundamental phenomena (…) are physical, turns out false, for in such a world, there are no fundamental phenomena, and so fundamental phenomena determine nothing. While some take physicalism necessarily to posit a fundamental level, here I present a thesis of physicalism that allows for its truth even in an infinitely decomposable world.

Post-Physicalism

Post-Physicalism,

Final version: Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):61-80, 2001

draft of Post-Physicalism

What exactly is the problem, inherited from Descartes, that we now call “the mind-body problem”? In his most recent book, Jaegwon Kim provides an answer with which many would agree. “Through the ’70’s and ’80’s and down to this day,” Kim tells us, “the mind-body problem-our mind-body problem-has been that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical.” This problem, which at one time was at home mainly in departments of philosophy, is now studied by a broad range of disciplines. One finds, for example, neuroscientists arguing that certain discoveries about the brain show that consciousness is physical, researchers in artificial intelligence claiming that because human thought can stimulated by complex computers, thought requires nothing beyond the physical and evolutionary biologists declaring that insights into the evolution of the mind indicate that it must be fundamentally physical. But what does it mean to be physical? While the basic results of the research being done may be clear enough, how are we to interpret the further claim “and this shows that the mind is physical”? The answer is that we have no idea.

I am going to argue that it is time to come to terms with the difficulty of understanding what it means to be physical and start thinking about the mind-body problem from a new perspective. Instead of construing the mind-body problem as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally physical world, we should think of it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, a world that is at its most fundamental level entirely nonmental. The mind-body problem, I want to argue, is the problem of determining whether mentality can be accounted for in terms of nonmental phenomena. In other words, it is the question, “is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”

The Body Problem

The Body Problem,  Noûs 33 (2):183-200, 1999.  JSTOR

The Body Problem Draft

 

Abstract. Is the mind physical? Are mental properties, such as the property of being in pain or thinking about the higher orders of infinity, actually physical properties? Certainly many philosophers think that they are. For no matter how strange and remarkable consciousness and cognition may be, many hold that they are, nevertheless, entirely physical. While some take this view as a starting point in their discussions about the mind, others, well aware that there are dissenters among the ranks, argue for it strenuously. One wonders, however, just what is being assumed, argued for, or denied. In other words, one wonders, Just what does it mean to be physical? This is the question I call, “the body problem.”

What is the Physical?

“What is the Physical?” (2oo5) In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.

Here is a draft of the paper.  Please quote only from published version.

draft What is the physical? (2005).