Tag Archives: the causal argument for physicalism

Varieties of Causal Closure

Here is a draft of a 2003 paper that attempts to unravel the concept of causal closure as it occurs in the literature on physicalism:

Varieties of Causal Closure

The final version is in Sven Walter, Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, eds. Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic.

The Epistemic/Ontic Divide

Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research66 (2):404-418.

A number of philosophers think that although we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, loses its force.