Tag Archives: Frank Jackson

Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?

Barbara Gail Montero, “Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?”, Journal of Philosophy, 2013.

Here is a close to final draft of the paper:
Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?

Abstract. In the literature on physicalism, one finds a plethora of supervenience relations along with debates over their respective roles in formulating the thesis of physicalism. However, one finds little, if any, debate over whether a weak supervenience principle, of the sort proposed by Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, and David Lewis is necessary for physicalism. This article questions whether a supervenience principle, even of this weak sort, is necessary for physicalism.

Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical, New York City, 2012

This is a talk I gave for the CUNY Philosophy Colloquium on February 22, 2012, which was included as a presentation for the Online Consciousness Conference, with commentary by Robert Howell, Gene Witmer and Frank Jackson.  Please visit the conference site for further information, including links to the commentaries, my responses and discussion.

Physicalism Could Be True Even if Mary Learns Something New

Barbara Montero (2007). Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New. Philosophical Quarterly57 (227):176-189.

Here is a close to final draft of Physicalism could be true even if Mary learns something new.

Abstract. Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary’s acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order (…) to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red.