Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?

Barbara Gail Montero, “Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?”, Journal of Philosophy, 2013.

Here is a close to final draft of the paper:
Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?

Abstract. In the literature on physicalism, one finds a plethora of supervenience relations along with debates over their respective roles in formulating the thesis of physicalism. However, one finds little, if any, debate over whether a weak supervenience principle, of the sort proposed by Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, and David Lewis is necessary for physicalism. This article questions whether a supervenience principle, even of this weak sort, is necessary for physicalism.

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